as original rather than as responding, positively or negatively, to Aristotelian theories. He occasionally suggests Academic influence, but as David Hahm points out in his excellent critique of this work, Sandbach's negative methodology makes it difficult to advance any hypothesis of influence on the Stoics. 2 1 agree with Hahm's final estimation of Sandbach's work: given the lack of direct evidence for influence, scholars are unwarranted in assuming that such influence existed -thus Sandbach's weaker claim is true, and he has done a great service to ancient scholarship by challenging us to be more careful in attributing Aristotelian views to the Stoics. But the stronger claim is not proven true, because lack of direct evidence does not prove the absence of influence. Rather, it indicates that our claims of influence must rest on the strength of our indirect evidence, viz. similarity of theory. In this paper I will present what seems to me compelling evidence that the Stoics not only knew of, but even adopted Aristotle's physiological description of human action. My methodology will be to show that there is a very high degree of similarity between the Aristotelian and Stoic theories; that as far as we can tell from the extant remains no one else besides Aristotle had such a theory which could have influenced the Stoics; and that given the peculiarity of the theory, it is highly unlikely that the Stoics formulated this theory independently of its inventor who lived in such close temporal and spatial proximity. 3 2 'Aristotle and the Stoics: A Methodological Crux', 300-1 3 Consider the story of the fate of Aristotle's written work. When he died in 322 BCE he left his library to his successor Theophrastus. When Theophrastus died in 288 he left his and Aristotle's library to Neleus of Skepsis. When Neleus died he left them to his non-philosophical relatives, who hid them in a cellar to avoid confiscation by the book-buyers for the great libraries at Alexandria and Pergamum. But eventually they were sold to Apellicon of Teos in the first century BCE, then exported to Rome where Andronicus of Rhodes finally catalogued and published them around 30-20 BCE. Sandbach leans heavily on this story to argue that Aristotle's written work was unavailable, and hence unknown, for most of the Hellenistic period. However, by the time Theophrastus died and the books supposedly disappeared, Zeno of Citiumthe founder of the Stoa -had been living in Athens for some 24 years and running the Stoa for 13. It is also quite likely that there were other copies of Aristotle's works in circulation, or copies of notes by his students, and that his views were known by word of mouth. Also, the Lyceum remained active at least through the time of Strato (c.270 BCE), which was about ten years after Chrysippus' birth. So Zeno could have had access to Aristotle's own library before Theophrastus died, and he and Clean-
In Part 11 will describe Aristotle's physiological theory of how the soul moves the body. In Part III will reconstruct the Stoic theory, and then the similarity of the two will be apparent. But before I can reasonably conclude that the Stoics adopted Aristotle's theory I must show that similar theories were not available to the Stoics from any other source. To this end, Part III will briefly survey relevant medical and physiological research from its beginnings in the generation before Aristotle to the time of Chrysippus.
I Aristotle's Theory
In the first book of the de Anima (DA) Aristotle asserts repeatedly that the soul is that which originates movement in the body.
4 DA ΠΙ 9 first asks specifically 'what it is in the soul which produces movement ' (432al8-19) , and deMotu Animalium 6-11 gives Aristotle's fullest answer to this difficult question. His physiological theory of bodily movement can be extracted from a survey of these texts.
In de Anima III 9 Aristotle identifies the cause of bodily motion by a process of elimination, first arguing that neither the nutritive soul nor the perceptive soul can be sufficient for movement, because if they were, plants and all animals would be capable of locomotion, which is falsethe so-called 'imperfect' animals (the ones that have only the sense of touch) are stationary. 5 In the course of ruling out nutritive and perceptive soul as sufficient for locomotion Aristotle gives two arguments concerning desire which are worth noting because they reveal that the first necessary condition for movement is experiencing some form of desire for an object.
(1) 'Nothing which is not desiring or avoiding something moves unless as the result of force (βία)' (432M6-17), i.e., desire and avoidance are the causes of all non-forced locomotion.
(2) Therefore, locomotion 'is always for the sake of something and involves imagination and desire ' (432bl5-16) .
I have as yet found no argument anywhere for the premise of this argument, so it seems to be a fundamental assumption for Aristotle. From this premise Aristotle concludes that locomotion 'is always for the sake of something and involves imagination and desire.' Why does this follow? Because desire and avoidance are necessarily intentional, i.e., object-directed, and this object is the 'that for the sake of which' of locomotion (433al5). Moreover, the objects of desire and avoidance are the pleasant and the painful. Aristotle has already argued that:
(1) Where there is sensation there is pleasure and pain; (2) where there is pleasure and pain there is appetite (which is desire for the pleasant); so that (3) where there is sensation there is imagination and desire (413b22-24 and 414bl-6).
Since appetite is a species of desire it is obvious why sensation implies desire in this second argument, and also obvious why locomotion involves desire in the previous argument. But how does imagination -φαντασία -enter this discussion? Aristotle's analysis of this faculty is notoriously obscure, but we can answer the present question by noting that he identifies imagination as 'a movement taking place as a result of actual perception' (429al-2)7 Imagination is not the same thing as perception but it cannot occur without perception. So perception is a necessary condition for imagination but it is not clear whether it is also a sufficient condition. In DA III 10 Aristotle does claim that all animals See Nussbaum's De Motu Animahum, , for an excellent analysis of φαντασία, especially in action contexts. She argues that the φαντασία is not just an objective picture-image of a perceived object, but rather is an interpretive awareness of such an object which need not be like a mental picture. I agree with her on this point, but for the sake of simplicity and following convention, I substitute 'imagination' and 'image' for her transliterated 'phantasia' in quoting her translation of the MA.
have sensitive imagination. 8 In chapter 11 he seems to think that even 'imperfect' animals have imagination, but only in an 'indeterminate' way (433b31-4a5). So imagination may be directly implied by perception in this second argument. This now may explain how imagination enters into the previous argument about locomotion: desire and avoidance have as their objects the pleasurable and the painful, where there is pleasure and pain there is perception, 9 and where there is perception there is imagination.
On the other hand, even if this line of reasoning is implicit in the locomotion argument Aristotle may not mean that imagination is directly implied by perception. In the second argument, the perception syllogism, the conclusion should be 'where there is perception there is appetite', but Aristotle cashes this out as 'imagination and desire'. So also in the locomotion argument, 'desire and avoidance' seem meant to directly imply 'imagination and desire'. So επιθυμία in particular, and δρεξις in general, somehow directly involve imagination. A bit later Aristotle claims that an animal is not capable of desire without imagination (433b28-9). The reason for this seems to be that the job of φαντασία is to capture and present the/on« of the perceived or conceived object of desire (MA 8, 11, . By either approach however, perception, desire, and imagination are intimately bound together: whatever has one will also have the others. Let us keep these points in mind as we consider what causes animal and human motion.
Aristotle next considers the faculty of soul peculiar to humans. Neither intellect (νους) nor contemplative intellect (ό θεωρητικός) can be the cause of locomotion, because they are not concerned with pursuit and avoidance (432b26-9) as required by the premise of the first argument above. Even practical intellect (ό πρακτικός), which does involve pursuit and avoidance, is not a sufficient condition for locomotion, because it may think of a pleasant or painful object without causing locomotion or it may command movement but be overruled by επιθυμία (432b29-3a6). Nor is desire a sufficient condition (in adult humans), because the continent person's desires can be controlled by reason (433a6-8). From these considerations Aristotle concludes in chapter 10 that desire and practical intellect can produce locomotion. But imagination must count as a sort of thought, since humans sometimes follow imagination rather than knowledge and non-human animals have only imagination and no intellect. But imagination and practical intellect both presuppose desire, making desire the first necessary condition for action. Aristotle says:
Every desire too is for the sake of something; for the object of desire is the starting-point (αρχή) for the practical intellect... The object of desire produces movement, and, because of this, thought produces movement, because the object of desire is its starting-point. (433al5-20) Exactly how 'the object of desire produces movement' is explained in more detail in de Motu Animalium, which will be addressed shortly. For now what is important is Aristotle's conclusion that 'there is one thing which produces movement, the faculty of desire (το όρεκτικόν)' (433a21). But this is soon qualified: 'Hence that which produces movement will be one in kind, the faculty of desire as such -and first of all the object of desire (το όρεκτόν) (for this produces movement without being moved, by being thought of or imagined) ' (433blO-12) . This suggests that the desired object is more specifically the cause of motion.
Aristotle makes four further distinctions concerning desire qua cause of locomotion:
There are three things, one that which produces movement, second that whereby it does so, and third again that which is moved, and that which produces movement is twofold, that which is unmoved and that which produces movement and is moved. That which is unmoved is the practical good, and that which produces movement and is moved is the faculty of desire (for that which is moved is moved in so far as it desires, and desire as actual is a form of movement), while that which is moved is the animal; and the instrument by which desire produces movement is then something bodily. Hence it must be investigated among the functions common to body and soul. (433bl3-21) These four parts involved in an instance of desire are:
(la) That which produces movement and is itself unmoved -this is called 'the practical good,' which must be the desired object.
(Ib) That which produces movement and is itself moved -this is the faculty of desire.
(2) "That whereby' or 'the instrument' by which desire produces movement -Aristotle says here only that this is 'something bodily', and is found in a sort of joint because 'everything is moved by pushing and pulling' (433b21-26), but we shall see in de Motu Animalium that this is specifically the πνεύμα in the heart.
(3) That which is moved -this is the animal.
Note that there is implicit in these distinctions a certain dualism: the emphasis here is on the psychological, desiderative, intentional aspect of motion, but the bodily instrumental part which is also a necessary condition for motion suggests a physiological, mechanistic aspect that is explained in greater detail in the de Motu Animalium. So using de Anima III 9-10 as an introduction, let us now examine MA 6-11. MA 6 states the problem: 'How the soul moves the body, and what is the αρχή of an animal's motion ' (700blO-ll) . This chapter largely restates what we were told in DA ΙΠ 9 and 10: the producers of motion are reduced to desire and thought (νους); desire and the faculty of desire (these terms seem to be used interchangeably) produce morion and are themselves moved ([lb] in my list); the object of desire and the object of thought (το διανοητόν) are called 'first movers' and these impart morion but are themselves unmoved ([la] in my list).
In MA 7 we find the psychological and mechanistic aspects of animal motion explained back to back. The psychological aspect has so far been explained in terms of desire and, in the case of adult humans, thought; Aristotle now cashes this out more specifically in terms of the practical syllogism. The practical syllogism is similar in form to the theoretical syllogism, but there are two main differences. First, the latter is concerned with 'unchanging objects' (701a9), with the objects of knowledge in the strict sense (επιστήμη) which are necessary, eternal, etc., such as mathematical truths. The former is concerned with what is contingent and can be done. Second, the conclusion of the theoretical syllogism is a 'speculative proposition' (701alO), whereas the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action (701al2-13). For instance, whenever I think that every person should take walks, and that I am a person, I immediately take a walk: the conclusion here is the actual walking. We do not always consciously consider every step in such syllogisms, but rather skip the obvious premises and go straight to the action. For instance, in this example I do not consciously affirm that I am a person, but as soon as I think that every person should take walks I start off walking. This partly explains why action occurs so quickly: it is obvious that not every action is preceded by extended syllogistic deliberation; in fact, the practical syllogism may at least sometimes be only an explanatory device used to account for an action after the fact 10 . Many actions occur with no prior syllogistic reasoning, but follow immediately upon a desire. Animals and children, since they lack reason, cannot formulate practical syllogisms, so such a process does not account for their movements. Aristotle explains:
For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or imagination or thought towards the thing for-the-sake-of-which, he does at once what he desires. For the activity of the desire takes the place of questioning or thinking. "I have to drink," says appetite. "Here's drink," says sense-perception or imagination or thought. At once he drinks. This, then, is the way that animals are impelled (όρμώσι) to move and act: the proximate reason for movement is desire, and this comes to be either through sense-perception or through imagination and thought. With creatures that desire to act, it is sometimes from appetite or spiritedness and sometimes from [desire or] wish that they make or act. (701a29-bl) This explains the psychological aspect of the movement of animals and children, and together with the practical syllogism accounts for the actions of adult humans.
Aristotle next launches straightaway, with no transition, into the physiological, mechanistic aspect of motion. Animals, he tells us, are like 'automatic puppets' (701b2) in so far as they have bones and sinews that are analogous to the pegs and cables in the puppets. The puppets 'are set moving when a small motion occurs; the cables are released and the pegs strike against one another ' (701b2-3) , and likewise the animal moves when its sinews are released and slackened (701b7-10). The key difference between animals and these puppets is that the former undergo alteration (άλλοίωσις), and here is where Aristotle connects the psychological and physiological aspects of motion:
In the animal the same part has the capacity to become both larger and smaller and to change its shape, as the parts expand because of heat and contract again because of cold, and alter. Alteration is caused by images (φαντασίαι) and sense-perceptions and ideas. For sense-percep-tions are at once a kind of alteration and imagination and thinking have the power of the actual things. For it hams out that the form conceived of the [warm or cold or] pleasant or fearful is like the actual thing itself. That is why we shudder and are frightened just thinking of something. All these are affections and alterations; and when bodily parts are altered some become larger, some smaller.... Further, when, under the influence of heat or cold or some other similar affection, an alteration is produced in the region of the heart, even if it is only in an imperceptibly small part of it, it produces a considerable difference in the body, causing blushing and pallor, as well as shuddering, trembling, and their opposites. (701bl3-32) This psychological/physiological link is explained a bit further in MA 8. The ultimate cause of motion is the pleasant or painful object of pursuit or avoidance, that 'practical good' which produces movement but is itself unmoved. This object is represented to the animal through either sense-perception or imagination or, in the case of humans, thought. The image or thought is of necessity accompanied by a heating or chilling in the body (MA 8, . 'Accompanied by' translates ακολουθεί, which could mean that the physical alteration either 'goes along with' or 'follows after' the psychological phenomenon that corresponds to it. Aristotle seems a bit ambivalent regarding the strength of the connection between the thought/image and the heating/chilling: at 701b34 he says the psychological phenomenon is necessarily (εξ ανάγκης) accompanied by heating/chilling, but at 702al he weakens this to claim that the former is nearly always (πάντα σχεδόν) accompanied by the latter. Nussbaum argues in her commentary on de Motu Animalium that the sense perception or image or thought does not cause the physical alteration of heating/chilling (151). The relationship between the psychological event (the image in the 'soul') and the physiological event (the heating/chilling of πνεύμα in the heart) may well be that they are two complementary descriptions of the same phenomenon, just as anger is both a boiling of blood around the heart (qua material cause) and a desire to return pain for pain (qua formal cause, DA 11,403a25-b3). Aristotle claims that feelings of desire or avoidance are necessarily accompanied by heating or chilling based on his observation that πα&ηματα such as sexual desire and fear are accompanied by feelings of heating or chilling in a certain body part or sometimes in the whole body (702a3-5). This temperature change alters the 'inner regions' (702a8) which are naturally constituted so as to change between solid and liquid, and hard and soft. Aristotle does not yet specify what body part is capable of this. But it is because of this process of alteration in which 'the active and passive' naturally interact 12 that 'at once the one acts and the other is acted upon' (702al5). Aristotle further explains:
That is why it is pretty much at the same time that the creature thinks it should move forward and moves, unless something else impedes it. For the affections suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the affections, and imagination the desire; and imagination comes about either through thought or through sense-perception. The rapidity and simultaneity result from the fact that the active and passive are naturally relative to each other. (702al5-21) This explains why the agent 'does at once what he desires' (701a30) when his sense-perception or imagination or thought is directed towards the desired object. I perceive or think of the object I desire, and this produces an image of the object, which by some obscure but direct interaction with desire and the affections alters an organic bodily part (thought and imagination present the form of the desired object and it is this form which triggers the affection, 703bl8-20). This, again obscurely but directly, results in my moving towards the object. The final movement is seemingly simultaneous with the initial perception or thought because 'the active and passive are naturally relative to each other,' i.e., that is just how the body works.
There is then a long argument, extending through chapter 9, which concludes that the soul or at least the αρχή of the movement-imparting soul is in the middle region of the body (702bl5-16). Happily, this is also where the faculty of sense-perception is located. 13 Aristotle says of the mechanics involved in this region: 'So that when, because of sense-perception, the area around the origin is altered and changes, the adjacent parts change also, expanding and contracting, so that by these means animal motion necessarily comes about' (702b21-5).
In chapter 10 we are finally told exactly what this middle region is: the πνεύμα in the heart, πνεύμα is a hot and airy material stuff, usually translated breath' or 'air'. The heart, in addition to being full of blood, contains πνεύμα (703al4-16; PA III 4, 667a27-9). πνεύμα is the source of the animal's power and strength (703a9-10). It is able to contract and expand, and pull and push (703a22-23), and thus start off the mechanical chain reaction in the joints that results ultimately in the animal's moving. The πνεύμα is called 'the tool (το όργανον) of movement' (703a20), and is clearly the bodily instrumental part referred to in DA ΠΙ10 ( [2] in my list above). Yet MA 10 opens: 'According to the account that gives the reason for motion, desire is the middle, which imparts movement being moved. But in living bodies there must be some body of this kind ' (703a4-6) . This Ijody' is the πνεΰμα, and seems to satisfy the description 'imparts movement and is itself moved,' 14 which raises the question of the relationship between desire or the faculty of desire and the πνεύμα ([lb] and [2] in my list). Is the faculty of desire in some sense a bodily part, namely, the πνεΰμα? Or does Aristotle just mean that this faculty is located 'in' the πνεΰμα (whatever 'in' means)? These questions raise the very large problem of the relationship between soul and body in Aristotle's philosophy, a problem too complicated to be addressed here.
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What is clear is that when this πνεΰμα is heated or chilled it expands or contracts, 16 and this pushes or pulls the connected body parts (sinews and bones), and thus movement is relayed throughout the joints of the body until we get up and walk towards or flee from the object of our desire or avoidance. Aristotle said earlier in his comparison of moving creatures with puppets that when the sinews and bones 'are released and slackened the creature moves' (701b9-10). The expansion and contraction of πνεύμα in the heart pushes and pulls, causing this releasing and slackening of sinews and bones. Aristotle specifies in MA 11 that these heatings and chillings are 'responsible for' or are the 'cause of (αίτίαι) bodily movements (703bl4-15), but he gives no details explaining how the expansion and contraction of warm air in the heart could push and pull the muscles, bones, or limbs. He probably never worked out such details, but I will speculate on the possibilities shortly. But despite its vagueness, what makes this account so significant is that it is ihe first theory to give us a stage-by-stage description of how psychological phenomena are translated into bodily action. Note that in this description movement originates in the πνεύμα in the heart and extends outward to the limbs; we will see shortly that πνεύμα also works in the opposite direction relaying sensations from sense organs inward to the heart. This theory that I have sketched from MA 7-10 is said by Aristotle to explain 'how animals move with voluntary motions' (703b3). But in MA 11 he briefly mentions 'involuntary' and 'non-voluntary' movements, the former of which is also described as involving expansion or contraction. Note that involuntary and non-voluntary do not mean here what they mean in Nicomachean Ethics III 1. Rather, in MA 11 'involuntary' refers to 'such movements as those of the heart and the penis; for often these are moved when something appears, but without the command of thought ' (703b5-8) . And 'non-voluntary' describes 'movements such as sleep and waking and respiration, and all the others of this kind; for neither imagination nor desire is, strictly speaking, in control of any of only that 'the parts adjacent to the origin' (i.e., the body's center: the heart) are altered thusly 2) MA 10, 703a20-l, where 'expanding' is αύξάνεσθαι and 'contracting' is συστέλλεσθαι. Here Aristotle says quite explicitly that the πνεΰμα itself expands and contracts 3) PA ΙΠ 4,666bl4-18: "The heart again is abundantly supplied with sinews (νεύρων), as might reasonably be expected. For the motions of the body commence from the heart, and are brought about by traction (ελκειν) and relaxation (άνιέναι). The heart therefore, which, as already said, is as it were a living creature inside its possessor, requires some such subservient and strengthening parts.' these' (703b8-ll). The non-voluntary are the automatic, unconscious, mechanical motions in the body, and are of no concern here. The involuntary are not intentional and goal-directed as are the truly voluntary, yet they do involve imagination and desire to some degree. Aristotle seems to be thinking of cases such as the heart leaping in fear when one is startled, or the penis becoming erect when a man sees something arousing; such reactions are not sufficient to initiate locomotion, 17 but the person is obviously responding to a perception or image of something that evokes desire, repulsion, fear, etc. As Aristotle said that the image of the pleasant or painful object is necessarily accompanied by heating or chilling (MA 8, 701b34-5), such involuntary reactions would involve at least a minimal heating or chilling, therefore a minimal expansion or contraction, and therefore a minimal bodily movement (a jumping when startled, an erection when aroused).
This account of movement in de Anima and de Motu Animalium explicitly mentions πνεύμα only in the heart, but Aristotle's biological works suggest that πνεύμα plays a larger role, especially in reproduction and sense perception. 18 In de Generatione Animalium (GA) Π 3 we learn that the male's semen contains πνεύμα, which is the vehicle by which the 'αρχή of the soul' is transmitted from father to offspring. Here πνεύμα is said to be analogous to the element of the stars, i.e., the fifth element ether. In discussing spontaneous generation in III 11 Aristotle argues that since earth contains water, and water contains πνεύμα, and all πνεύμα contains 'soul-heat', then 'in a way all things are full of soul' (762al9-22). The first passage elevates the status of πνεύμα to something nearly divine, while the second passage makes πνεύμα nearly ubiquitous (in the sublunary region); interestingly, this anticipates the role of πνεύμα in Stoic philosophy as a truly divine and ubiquitous substance. Aristotle later comments on the wide usage of πνεύμα: 'So it is reasonable that nature should perform most of her operations using breath [πνεύμα] as an instrument, for as some instruments serve many uses in the arts, e.g., the hammer and anvil in the smith's art, so does breath in things formed by nature' (GA V 8, 789b7-ll).
Regarding perception, there seems to be a continuous system of πνεύμα running from the sense organs to the heart, by means of which the movements of sensation travel to the heart (which is of course the seat of the perceptive soul). 19 Aristotle says in GA II 6 that 'smell and hearing are passages full of innate πνεύμα, connecting with the outer air and terminating at the small blood-vessels around the brain which extend thither from the heart' (744al-5). In de Partibus Animalium (PA) Π 10 he says the eyes, and again the ears, have passages running from them to the blood-vessels around the brain. Here he does not mention πνεύμα, but says the ear is full of air. Since πνεύμα is a type of air, 20 and we already know from the GA that the passages from the ears contain πνεύμα, it is likely implicit here that the passages from both the eyes and the ears contain πνεύμα. (These 'passages' were later discovered to be nerves by Herophilus and Erasistratus -discussed in section III below -who continued to believe them to be filled with πνεύμα.) And although it is not explicit in the texts, it seems that all the blood is charged with πνεύμα when it is first manufactured in the heart 21 : in Aristotle's Theory of Material Substance Freudenthal argues that it is the action of the vital heat in the blood that creates tiny bubbles of πνεύμα by concoction (120-1). In fact, only πνεύμα in the blood-vessels could account for a flow of perceptual information from the sense organs into the heart, for at least two reasons. First, Aristotle is explicit in PA III 4 that blood is manufactured by concoction from nutriment in the heart and flows outward through the veins, and no blood enters into the heart from outside it (666a6-8); and second, he insists that blood is merely a form of nutriment in the body and as such cannot itself enable us to perceive, although the presence of blood is a necessary condition for perception. 22 And as Freudenthal notes, the blood vessels are the only available pathways through which the movements of sensation could travel:
As long as the arteries were not functionally differentiated from the veins nor the nerves discovered, the communication between the perceiving centre ... and loci throughout the rest of the body where the perceptions originate, had to be indistinctly ascribed to all the vessels: there was no other "part" which, being continuous between the centre and the periphery, was a possible candidate for this office. (132) Thus, there must be a continuous system of πνεΰμα in place from the sense organs all the way to the heart. So if we may assume that the veins contain πνεΰμα, sense-perception is explained as follows. Let us take the simpler case of seeing or hearing. Aristotle rejects the effluence theories of the atomists and Empedocles, which claim that objects give off particles which come into direct contact with the sense organ. Rather, there must be an intermediate substance such as air or water which transmits 'movements' from the object to the sense organ (de Sensu 2, . When Aristotle defines perception as taking in the object's form without its matter, these 'movements' may be the physiological counterpart of this 'form'. 23 So these movements travel from the object to the sense organ via some intermediate substance, then they travel through the πνεΰμα in the sense organ's 'channels', then through the πνεΰμα in the blood through the blood-vessels, first going around the brain then to the heart where they register as perceptions in or by the 'common sense '. 24 This much of the physiological process of perception can be attributed to Aristotle with some confidence, I think, although it is inferred from the texts and never explicitly explained by him. What remains very obscure and rather mysterious is exactly how the movements of sensation 'travel' by means of the πνεύμα. Would the πνεύμα bubbles flow outward from the heart along with the blood? If so, the movements of sensation would have to struggle upstream, so to speak, to get to the heart. Or perhaps the πνεύμα bubbles rest in place in the veins as the blood flows past them, and maybe they vibrate or hit each other domino-style as sensations pass through them. Even more difficult is the question of how the expansion and contraction of πνεύμα in the heart can move the whole body. As I noted above, it is clear in the MA that this expansion and contraction is directly responsible for the pushing and pulling of sinews and bones; but Freudenthal argues that it must again be the πνεύμα running through the veins which transmits whatever motions result in bodily locomotion, his main reason being that the sinews do not extend through the entire body as the veins do (135). Personally, I find it easier to imagine warm air in the heart pushing and pulling the sinews and bones, which then moves the limbs, than warm air in the veins moving the limbs those veins run through. But either way, we are speculating concerning details about which Aristotle was silent. He saw that there must be some sort of relay system between the periphery and center to explain the mechanics of perception and movement; when Herophilus and Erasistrarus discovered the nerves, they distinguished between sensory and motor nerves (both filled with πνεύμα) to accomplish these two tasks.
To briefly recapitulate, considering together the two theories I have sketched, the explanation of bodily motion from DA and MA and the explanation of sense perception, we see that the πνεύμα functions in two directions. First, sense perception is explained by movements traveling from the sense organs inward to the heart carried on or by the πνεύμα which is continuous from the sense organs, channels, and blood vessels to the heart. Second, bodily motion, which is the animal's response to the perceptions it receives, is explained by the heating and chilling and subsequent expansion and contraction of πνεύμα in the heart being relayed outward to the limbs, via the pushing and pulling of sinews and bones. We shall next see that the Stoics also speak of expansions and contractions of πνεύμα in the heart.
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II Chrysippus' Theory
The Stoics are materialists, so that soul and body are both corporeal. The world is composed of matter which is passive, and god which is active and shapes the matter. 26 More specifically, the world is composed of earth, water, air, and fire; earth and water are passive, while air and fire are active. Fire and air together compose πνεύμα, and the hot fire's expansion seems to conflict with the cold air's contraction in such a way as to produce a kind of motion. The details here are quite obscure, but πνεύμα can be qualitatively altered to take various forms, where the 'tension' (τόνος) of a body's πνεύμα determines what sort of body it is. The active πνεύμα 'sustains' or 'holds together' (συνέχειν) the passive matter, giving form and quality to bodies. Inanimate bodies such as sticks and stones contain πνεΰμα in the simplest form, called 'tenor' (έξις). Plants contain πνεΰμα in the form of 'physique' (φύσις). Animals, including people, contain πνεΰμα in the form of soul (ψυχή), and humans also contain it in the form of rational soul. The more complex bodies include the less complex forms of πνεΰμα as well: e.g., our bones are like stones, and our nails and hair are like plants. 27 The unity of these different types of matter within a single animal or human body is explained by the Stoics in terms of mixture: 'An animal is a composite of body and soul ... [which are] blended through and through.' 28 Our soul, then, is πνεΰμα (itself material: fire and air) in a certain form, which is mixed throughout the body. The Stoics describe the soul-πνεΰμα not only as mixed with the body, but also as extending throughout the body with parts like the tentacles of an octopus, with the rational soul-πνεΰμα or commanding-faculty (το ήγεμονικόν) localized in the heart. 29 Aetius reports:
The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty is the soul's highest part, which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses. ... From the commanding-faculty there are seven parts of the soul which grow out and stretch out into the body like the tentacles of an octopus Five of these are the senses, sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch. Sight is πνεύμα which extends from the commanding-faculty to the eyes, hearing is πνεΰμα which extends from the commanding-faculty to the ears.... Of the remainder, one is called seed, and this is πνεΰμα extending from the commanding-faculty to the genitals. The other,... which they also call utterance, is πνεΰμα extending from the commanding-faculty to the pharynx, tongue and appropriate organs.
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Chrysippus used the spider analogy to make the same point:
In the same way as a spider in the center of the web holds in its feet all the beginnings of the threads, in order to feel by close contact if an insect strikes the web, and where, so does the ruling part of the soul, situated in the middle of the heart, check on the beginnings of the senses, in order to perceive their messages from close proximity.
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As materialists it is easier for the Stoics to explain soul-body interaction, and another fragment reports that:
by stretching out (τεινομένη έξω 32 ) and relaxing (μετ' αφέσεως), the soul makes an impression on all the body's parts, since it is blended with them all, and in making an impression it receives an impression in This 'stretching out' and 'relaxing' and 'joint pressure' here explains the commanding faculty's awareness of and communication with its own body.
For the Stoics, any action must be preceded by impression, assent, and impulse. 34 Receiving an impression from a desired object is the first necessary condition for action. Chrysippus defines impression as 'an imprinting in the soul, i.e., an alteration/ and it occurs specifically in the soul-πνεΰμα of the commanding-faculty in the heart. 35 Our sense organs are constantly stimulated by external objects, and since the soul and body are blended, an affection travels from, say, our eyes, through our soul-πνεΰμα to our commanding-faculty in the heart, where it enters our conscious awareness. This is very similar to Aristotle's description of perception, except that the soul-πνεΰμα is said to be blended with the body instead of being confined to passages and blood-vessels.
Assent is the second necessary condition for action, and also the necessary condition for impulse: 'Without assent there is neither action nor impulsion.' 36 The mind assents to a proposition recommending an action related to the impression being experienced; e.g., (to use Inwood's example, 60) when faced with a piece of cake the sweet-toothed man assents to the proposition 'it is fitting for me to eat this cake'. The relation between assent and impulse is controversial and does not concern me here.
37 Most likely, either assent temporally precedes impulse, or they are two aspects of one phenomenon. Either way, the third necessary condition for and efficient cause of action is experiencing an 'impulse' (ορμή) towards the desired object or a 'repulsion' (αφορμή) away from an unwanted object.
38 Impulse and repulsion, like Aristotle's desire and aversion, are both psychological and physiological phenomena. Under its psychological description, impulse in humans is defined as 'a movement of thought towards something in the sphere of action,' 39 and while assent is given to a proposition, impulse is some sort of movement towards the predicate of that very proposition. 40 While this makes the object of impulse a linguistic entity (a λεκτόν), this entity represents the real desired object, e.g., the cake, and the Stoics speak of impulse as the direct cause of the action of reaching for the cake.
The Stoics insist that all human impulse is rational because the soul has no irrational parts. However, some impulses are 'excessive' and 'disobedient to reason/ and such impulses are called 'passions' (πάθη).
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A passion is not an 'emotion' in our sense, but rather refers specifically to an excessive impulse; the Stoics countenance many emotions as appropriate impulses, as long as they are not excessive. They divide all reasonable impulses (or 'good feelings', εύπάθειαι) into joy, watchfulness, and wishing. 42 Joy includes delight, sociability, cheerfulness; watchfulness includes respect, cleanliness; and wishing includes kindness, generosity, warmth, affection. 43 There are four species of passion: appetite (επιθυμία), fear (φόβος), pleasure (ηδονή), and distress (or 'pain' -λύπη). Stobaeus differentiates them: Appetite and fear come first, the former in relation to what appears good, and the latter in relation to what appears bad. Pleasure and distress result from these: pleasure, whenever we get the objects of our appetite or avoid the objects of our fear; distress, whenever we fail to get the objects of our appetite or experience to objects of our fear.
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Appetite and fear are future-looking, while pleasure and distress are responses to the present situation. Inwood translates this text a bit differently, calling appetite ('desire') and fear the 'primary' passions, and pleasure and distress ('pain') the 'subordinate' (146). All vices are subsumed under one of these four passions (e.g., appetite includes anger, intense sexual desire, cravings and yearnings, love of pleasure and riches and honours). 45 Since all human impulses are rational, passions are also:
Passion is no different from reason, and there is no dissension and conflict between the two, but a turning of the single reason in both directions, which we do not notice owing to the sharpness and speed of the change. ... Appetite and anger and fear and all such things are corrupt opinions and judgments, which do not arise about just one part of the soul but are the whole commanding-faculty's inclinations, yieldings, assents and impulses.
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This monistic psychology, allowing disobedience to reason but not irrational parts, is obviously problematic and has been much discussed. I will not pursue this psychological dimension of impulse, as I am presently concerned with the physiological dimension. The physiological description of impulse must be reconstructed from fragments whose significance, I believe, has lain unrecognized. Galen, in On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP), criticizes Chrysippus' denial of irrational parts of the soul. In the course of his criticism he reports Chrysippus' definitions of distress and pleasure, the two subordinate passions. Galen says that Chrysippus first defines distress as 'a fresh belief that evil is present' and pleasure as 'a fresh belief that good 44 ) in addition to shrinkings (μειώσεις) and swellings (επάρσεις). 50 Galen's complaint is that the first definition is in terms of the rational part of the soul and the second is in terms of an irrational part, but Chrysippus denies the existence of an irrational part. I am here unconcerned with the details of Galen's criticism. What is relevant is that Galen has just revealed the psychological and physiological descriptions of two of the four species of passion. He sees these two descriptions as indicating the existence of conflicting rational and irrational parts of soul, but I believe they are in fact complementary, in the same way Aristotle's psychological and physiological accounts of desire are complementary: they are two descriptions of a single phenomenon. 51 The second definition Galen reports reveals the physiological guise of impulse: it is an expansion or contraction.
A bit later Galen reports Chrysippus' view that passions not only are judgments but also are identified with expansions, contractions, etc.:
47 Where 'fresh' probably means either recent or intense; see Inwood, 147,  This text is rather vague, but it at least suggests that all passions are correlated with physical alterations such as expansions and contractions.
Other sources confirm that the two subordinate passions were described in terms of expansion and contraction. Two centuries before Galen, Andronicus reported these definitions of the four passions: C) Distress is an irrational contraction (συστολή), or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be contracted. Fear is an irrational shrinking (εκκλισις), or avoidance of an expected danger. Appetite is an irrational stretching (desire, ορεξις), or pursuit of an expected good. Pleasure is an irrational swelling (επαρσις), or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it right to be swollen.
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This text clearly shows pleasure and distress to be expansions and contractions, but is not very good evidence for either appetite or fear. First, 'stretching' translates ορεξις, which is arguably not meant as a physical stretching, δρεξις comes from όρέγω, the root meaning of which is to stretch out or reach out, so it is possible that the Stoics here conceive of appetite as an irrationally-motivated stretching out of soul-πνεΰμα. However, by their time δρεξις is so commonly used to refer to a psychological 'reaching for', i.e., a desire, that I cannot argue that δρεξις here means anything more than that. Second, 'shrinking' translates εκκλισις, by which Long and Sedley mean 'aversion' or a literal 'turning away from' rather than 'contraction'. 54 έκκλίνω means to T?end out of the regular line', 'dislocate', 'turn away', 'avoid', and εκκλισις correspondingly means 'turning out of one's course', dislocation', 'avoidance', 52 PHP 4.3.2; LS 65K (1) 53 Andronicus, On Passions 1 (SVF 3.391, part; LS 65B) 54 See their commentary on 65B, vol. 1,421. which pairs well with the root meaning of ορεξις as turning or reaching towards something. The Stoic word choice thus suggests that pleasure and distress are small scale expansions and contractions within the body (specifically of the soul-πνεΰμα), while appetite and fear are large scale movements of the mind and the whole body towards or away from something.
Stobaeus also associates the passions with expansions and contractions: D) In the case of all the soul's passions, when they [the Stoics] call them Opinions', Opinion' is used instead of 'weak supposition', and 'fresh' instead of 'the stimulus of an irrational contraction (συστολής) or swelling (έπάρσεως) '. 55 However, only pleasure and distress are called 'fresh' opinions, so this text reconfirms that the subordinate passions are expansions and contractions, although it is silent concerning the primary passions of pleasure and distress (despite its misleading subject 'all the soul's passions').
In Tusculan Disputations Cicero provides the Stoic definition of distress -aegritudo -as: E) a newly formed belief of present evil, the subject of which thinks it right to feel depression and shrinking of soul (demitti contrahique animo).
56
And again: F) the first definition of distress is that it is a shrinking together (contractio) of the soul in conflict with reason' (ibid.).
In his Loeb translation of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, King notes (342) that contractio answers to the Greek συστολή, and he says 'joy is expansion, grief contraction/ understanding elatio as expansion.
57 Seneca notes that: 55 Stobaeus 2.88, 3 (SVF 3.378, part; LS 65C) 56 4.14, J Ε King's translation from Loeb edition 57 As does Inwood, 174.
G) joy is an 'elation of spirit' (animi elatio)!*
This identifies a reasonable impulse, as opposed to a passion, with what sounds like a physical expansion in the soul.
Diogenes Laertius seems to suggest that all three types of reasonable impulse are defined in the same physiological terms: H) They [the Stoics] say that there are three good feelings: joy (χαράν), watchfulness (εϋλάβειαν), wishing (βούλησιν). Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling (επαρσιν); and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, consisting in well-reasoned shrinking (έκκλισιν). For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will be watchful. They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in well-reasoned stretching (desire, δρεξιν). 59 Joy is the correct (i.e., rational) version of pleasure, watchfulness is the correct version of fear, and wishing of appetite; interestingly, there is no correct version of distress (and thus the sage would feel no form of pain, and be perfectly undisturbed and happy). This text uses the same three Greek terms -έπαρσιν, εκκλισιν, and δρεξιν -used in text C to describe fear, appetite, and pleasure. Given the meanings of these terms discussed above, this text, like C, would support επαρσιν, and so joy, being meant as a small scale expansion within the body, and εκκλισιν and δρεξιν, and so watchfulness and wishing, being meant as a large scale movement of the mind and whole body away from or towards something.
The eight texts (A-H) together provide the following evidence concerning the various types of impulses and expansions and contractions: 6. Joy is an elatio in G; επαρσις in H. 7. Watchfulness is an εκκλισις in H.
Wishing is an ορεξις in H.
This (1 and 2) shows that there is very strong evidence that the subordinate passions of pleasure and distress were considered to be literal physical expansions and contractions. Text Β provides some evidence (3) for thinking that all passions are expansions or contractions: the three Greek terms used in Β are the same ones used to describe distress and pleasure in A, C, and D, and one term used for expansion -επαρσις -is the same term used in H to describe the reasonable impulse of joy. The primary passions of fear and appetite (4 and 5) and the corresponding reasonable impulses of watchfulness and wishing (7 and 8) are described in Greek as movements towards or away from something, and so are best understood as a sort of large scale psychological and whole-body motion, and not a covert internal expansion or contraction of soul-πνεΰμα. I believe the evidence (6) is good for taking the reasonable impulse of joy to be an expansion because two different sources (G and H) identify it as such, and the well-reasoned επαρσις of H recurs as the irrational επαρσις of A, B, C, and D.
The so-called 'preliminary passions' (propatheiai), 60 those involuntary and unthinking responses to stimuli, are also identified with expansions and contractions. Aulus Gellius quotes Epictetus' view (which he claims to be consistent with Zeno and Chrysippus) of a sage's reaction to being startled: 'even a sage's soul [will] be moved for a short while and be contracted and grow pale (paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere), not because he has formed an opinion of anything evil but because of certain rapid and unreflective movements which forestall the proper function of the intellect and reason.' 61 Cicero reports the same view: the wise man will not experience the passion of distress (and as noted above, there is no correct version of λύπη), but 'all the same the sting and certain minor symptoms of shrinking (contractiunculae) of soul will be left' (TD 3.83). These preliminary passions are analogous to the involuntary move-60 On which see Inwood, 61 Attic Nights 19.1.17, translation following Inwood, 177 merits of Aristotle's de Motu Animalium 11, which as I noted above, involve at least minimal expansions or contractions.
One may be tempted to dismiss the Stoic references to expansion and contraction as merely a metaphorical way of referring to the phenomenological 'feel' of impulses, as when I say I am 'elated'. For instance, in The Therapy of Desire Nussbaum notes 'joy of the intense sort is experienced as a giddy inflation, a dangerous uplift that is never without the vertiginous sense that at any moment we may be dashed to the ground' (393). And A.C. Lloyd claims that the expansion/contraction terminology refers to the affective side of the passions (he uses 'emotions'): "The names of the "feelings" -e.g., systole ("contraction") and diachysis ("diffusion") -were in fact current names of the emotions for ordinary Greek speakers who did not think (or declined to think) of them as literal contractions and expansions' (238). However, Lloyd provides absolutely no evidence for this claim about the ordinary Greek usage of these terms, and Liddell-Scott's Greek-English Lexicon entries do not support his claim. And there are two reasons against dismissing the Stoic terminology as mere metaphor. First, these references are fairly frequent and consistent: as I showed above, numerous sources verify that the subordinate passions of pleasure and distress and the reasonable impulse of joy are described as expansions and contractions. Second, Stoic physics and physiology are consistent with these passions and the impulse being literal expansions and contractions: as I noted at the beginning of this section, πνεύμα is composed of fire and air. The hotness of fire and the coldness of air cause them to expand and contract, resulting in some sort of motion in the πνεύμα which seems meant to explain its 'tension', which in turn explains the form taken by the body that πνεύμα 'sustains'. Since impulse is an activity of the commandingfaculty, which is a physical mass of πνεύμα in the heart, it seems quite consistent with their materialism to claim that an impulse is a literal expansion or contraction of this mass. Furthermore, there need not be a conflict between impulses being a literal expansion/contraction of πνεύμα and their being felt as an expansion/contraction in one's heart or stomach or whole body; in fact, the former physiological condition would cause and account for the latter psychic condition or phenomenological 'feel'. Considering all this, it seems unreasonably dismissive and skeptical to insist that the Stoics were merely speaking metaphorically. I suggest we take them literally.
Since impulse and passion are activities of the commanding-faculty, which is a certain form of πνεύμα centralized in the heart, it must be this πνεύμα in the heart which expands and contracts. Impulse is for the Stoics the efficient cause of action and Inwood argues that it is both the necessary and sufficient condition for action (52), so it seems quite probable that they explained bodily movement in terms of this expansion and contraction of soul-πνεϋμα in the heart. In fact one text from Seneca suggests that it is the movement of πνεύμα in the mind (heart) which causes the limbs to move when one walks: 'Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus did not agree on what walking is. Cleanthes said it was breath (spiritum = πνεϋμα) extending from the commanding-faculty (principali = το ήγεμονικόν) to the feet, Chrysippus that it was the commanding-faculty itself.' 62 Inwood says of this disagreement between the two Stoics:
Cleanthes thought that the movement of the mind's pneuma (and this must be the impulse) sent out a separate jet of pneuma to the limbs as a motor stimulus. This, he said, should be called "walking". The action, properly speaking, is not the movement of the limbs but the pneuma which made them move. Chrysippus thought that the relation of mind to body was more intimate, and that the pneuma of the mind could act directly on the limbs and that this should properly be called "action". ... Both held that the mind was pneuma in the heart and that actions were causations of bodily movements by movements in that pneuma. They disagreed about the detailed pneumatic mechanics of seeing the limbs in motion and about which portion of this psycho-physical chain of events should be designated as the action itself. But these points are less significant than their shared belief in a cause of action, a motion of the material mind called impulse. 63 I agree completely with Inwood's analysis. My purpose in this paper is twofold. First, it is to supply the so far unrecognized link between impulse and bodily motion: the former is an expansion or contraction of πνεύμα in the heart which then moves the πνεύμα extending through the body like octopus tentacles, resulting in the movement of the limbs. Second, it is to argue that this theory was borrowed tween body and commanding-faculty is described in terms of the soul-πνεΰμα stretching out and relaxing, and also in terms of the mutual pressure upon each other of soul and body. Perception occurs when an object makes some sort of imprint on our sense organs which travels through the soul-πνεΰμα to the commanding faculty in the heart. Thus the Stoics like Aristotle would use the πνεΰμα to function in two directions: perception involves information traveling via the πνεΰμα inwards to the heart, and bodily motion involves expansions and contractions of πνεύμα in the heart being relayed outwards to the limbs. This is my reconstruction of the Stoic account of the physiological dimension of human action, and it is literally a reconstruction (the only one as far as I know 64 ) of the few relevant fragments we have. But I think it is right, and it reveals a physiological picture of perception and action nearly identical to Aristotle's. The differences are necessary to adapt Aristotle's theory to the Stoics' brand of materialism.
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As similar as these two theories are, I think it would be perverse for Sandbach to insist that the Stoics developed their theory independently, and that the similarity is sheer coincidence. But there is one thing left to do before one can reasonably conclude that the Stoics adopted Aristotle's theory, and that is to show that there was not anyone else they could have gotten it from. We know of no other philosopher who had a similar theory, and the only other likely source is the doctors, anatomists and physiologists of this period.
To see the scientific context in which Aristotle and the Stoics were working, I will briefly survey the relevant theories current at that time. 66 64 There are occasional references to the passions as expansions or contractions, but no one has recognized the Aristotelian-type theory I reconstruct here. See, e.g., Frede, 102; A C Lloyd, 234, 236, 238; impulses are motions in the pneuma of the hegemomkon; this psychological materialism was taken very seriously by the Stoics, although we find it relatively unenlightening to be told that such and such a psychological event is identifiable with a certain set of movements in the stuff of the mind.' 65 The differences are of course vast, but I have no space to address them here. I only mention the two most obvious: 1) the Stoic's 'mind' is material, Aristotle's is not; and 2) the Stoic's πνεΰμα is mixed with the body, while Aristotle's is contained in channels and veins. 
Ill Other Physiologists
There were two anatomists before Aristotle's time that he knew of and referred to. First is Alcmaeon of Croton, whose floruit was probably about 450 BCE. Very little is known about Alcmaeon, but he was famous for first dissecting the eye 67 and he was the first to mention passages (πόροι) from the eyes, ears, nose, and maybe tongue, to the brain. He is said to have thought that all of the senses were connected in some way with the brain, 68 but there is no evidence to suggest that he thought of the brain as the seat of consciousness or intellect. 69 He is relevant to our present topic because he shows that Aristotle did not discover the passages from the sense organs in the head, but rather this would have been fairly common knowledge at the time. And Alcmaeon's attributing some special role to the brain anticipates what is soon to become a very controversial question.
Diogenes of Apollonia was a younger contemporary of Alcmaeon (fl. c. 440-430). Aristotle, in his History of Animals III 2, describes and criticizes Diogenes' system of blood-vessels. Diogenes also spoke of passages connecting the ears and nose to the brain, but he seems to have thought that the eyes and tongue were connected to the heart. He does not address the question of there being one special place where thought or perception is centered, but heart and brain are both important to him.
as she admits (20nll), cursory and selective, it is a good starting point for anyone interested in Hellenistic medicine as it influenced philosophy, and it contains the references and bibliography one would need to pursue more detailed research. He was perhaps a follower of Anaximenes, 70 and air played a significant role in his physiology. 71 For instance, he thought that when we hear or smell something, the outside air enters our body and mixes with air in the brain to produce perception. He also associated air with thought, movement, and life in general.
72 He seems to have thought that the veins contained air as well as blood, and it was this air that made thought and perception possible: Theophrastus reports that 'the internal air is the real agent of perception, as it is a tiny fragment of divinity' (On the Senses 42) and 'thinking is due to pure dry air' (ibid., 44). However, Theophrastus adds that it is the mingling of air with our blood that causes thought and perception (ibid., 47). Diogenes is noteworthy because he attributed to air the sorts of functions which Aristotle soon afterwards attributed to πνεύμα. In Physics of the Stoics (10,26-7) Sambursky sees Diogenes' view of air as influencing the Stoics' view of πνεΰμα. I believe this is right, and Diogenes is one of many (including Aristotle) that influenced Stoic philosophy. Nevertheless, Diogenes does not have the specifically Aristotelian theory (of desires being expansions/contractions in the heart which cause bodily motion) which I find in Chrysippus.
Plato should be mentioned, not because he was a physiologist of course, but because he dabbled in physiological issues in the Timaeus. What is relevant to our subject is Plato's locating the three parts of the soul in three parts of the body (69c-72d). The rational soul is in the head, perhaps specifically in the brain, and the neck serves to block off the rational soul and protect it from being polluted by the lower parts. The spirited soul is in the chest area, perhaps in the heart; and the appetitive soul is in the region between midriff and navel, and is associated with the liver. 73 Plato speaks of 'narrow channels' (στενωπα, 70b) through which the rational soul sends commands to the rest of the body, and these are quite possibly the veins. He also seems to consider the veins (φλέβας) to be carriers of perceptual information from the sense organs to the parts of the soul (64a-68d), because he later describes two main veins extending from the left and right sides of the head to the opposite sides of the body whose functions are first, to fasten the head to the body, and second, to ensure that 'sensations from both sides might be distributed over the whole body' (77e, Jowett translation). In his general account of perception Plato says the mobile particles within us (the fiery and airy ones, as opposed to the sluggish watery and earthy ones) receive an impression and then pass this motion on to neighboring particles until the motion reaches the mind (το φρόνιμον) and announces the perceived quality (64b). It is not explicitly stated, but surely το φρόνιμον is in the head with the rational soul. This suggests that perceptual information travels from the sense organs to the brain. However, when Plato goes on to discuss particular sense organs this account is complicated. Taste occurs when particles of food enter the small veins in the tongue and interact with the 'moist delicate flesh' of these veins and/or the tongue (65c-d). Apparently sensation occurs in the tongue itself, but Plato notes that these veins in the tongue extend all the way to the heart (65d). Smell occurs when particles enter the veins in the nose, and Plato says smells are distinguished only into the painful and the pleasant: the painful sort 'irritate and disturb the whole cavity which is situated between the head and navel' and the pleasant particles have a soothing effect on the same region (66d-67a). So in this case sensation is not limited to the sense organ, but seems to occur in the central portion of the body where the spirited and appetitive souls reside. Plato describes hearing thus: 'sound is a blow which passes through the ears, and is transmitted by means of the air, the brain, and the blood, to the soul, and hearing is the vibration of this blow which begins in the head and ends in the region of the liver' (67b). This sounds as if the whole soul, from brain to liver, is involved in hearing. Vision is explained in terms of fiery particles entering the passages (τάς διεξόδους, 67e8) in the eye, and color perception seems to occur in the eye itself as the fiery particles 'force their way through and melt' the passages and otherwise interact with the fiery and watery nature of the eyeball. The fifth sense of touch is not discussed. This is a convoluted theory of perception, and Plato seems unconcerned with making it any more consistent. What it reveals to us, however, is that Plato was at least familiar with contemporary physiological theory and was imposing his own tripartite conception of the soul on that theory.
The first really interesting and significant text for our purposes is the Hippocratic work "The Sacred Disease'. Unfortunately this text is impossible to date accurately. Hippocrates himself was a contemporary of Socrates, but the Hippocratic corpus we have is believed to be composed of texts by various authors written at various times, all attributed to Hippocrates. But the author of 'The Sacred Disease', if not Hippocrates himself, was probably a younger contemporary of Socrates, so Aristotle could have been familiar with the theories of this text.
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The 'sacred disease' is epilepsy, and the Hippocratic author refutes the claim that it is caused by the gods by explaining how it is really caused by a certain dysfunctional state of the brain. Along the way he states his view that the brain is the center of consciousness, and this text is the first explicit formulation of such a belief. But air still has a vital role to play, as it did in Diogenes of Apollonia. The author says that when we breathe air in through our nose and mouth the air first goes through our brain, then part of it goes to our stomach to cool it off, and the other part goes to our lungs and blood-vessels to be dispersed to the rest of the body. Of this latter type of air he says 'It induces intelligence and is necessary for the movement of the limbs' (#10), but there is no explanation given of how this works.
He later says of the brain itself:
So long as it is healthy, it is the interpreter of what is derived from the air. Consciousness is caused by air. The eyes, ears, tongue, hands and feet perform actions which are planned by the brain, for there is a measure of conscious thought throughout the body proportionate to the amount of air which it receives. The brain is also the organ of comprehension, for when a man draws in a breath it reaches the brain first, and thence is dispersed into the rest of the body, having left behind in the brain its vigor and whatever pertains to consciousness and intelligence. (#19) This is sounding more like Aristotle, with air apparently functioning something like his πνεύμα does, although as in Diogenes this is just the ordinary external air we breathe in from the environment. The author of "The Sacred Disease' gives us no details to explain how air and brain do what they do, but it sounds as if the air must somehow carry into the brain all perceptual information. It is very unclear how this could work since this air enters through our nose and mouth, not our sense organs, and the author does not try to make it work. Of course he is interested in finding the cause of disease so as to cure it, so theories of perception, thought, and bodily movement are very peripheral to his goal. This Hippocratic author specifically attacks those who believe we think and feel with our heart. Likewise, when Aristotle, in de Partibus Animalium II10, is defending his view that the heart is the central organ of perception he specifically attacks those who say it is the brain. Since the date of 'The Sacred Disease' is unknown, we cannot say who knew whom; but by the time that text was written, and certainly by Aristotle's time, the battle lines between brain and heart were drawn.
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In the generation after Aristotle's death we know a little bit about two physiologists, Diocles of Carystus and Praxagoras of Cos. There is a striking difference between pre-and post-Aristotelian physiology, and that is the role of πνεύμα. Once Aristotle introduced πνεύμα to explain perception and bodily motion, all subsequent physiology presupposed its existence. The argument then was only about what channels it flowed through, and disagreement over the central organ -brain or heartalso continued.
Diocles and Praxagoras agreed that πνεύμα issues forth from the heart and spreads to the rest of the body through the blood-vessels, 76 but Praxagoras distinguished arteries from veins and said that πνεύμα runs through the arteries while the veins contain blood (fr. 9 and 85). One fragment says that the arteries are channels 'through which voluntary motion (ή κατάπροαιρεσιν κίνησις) is imparted to the body' (fr.75). There is nothing else in Praxagoras to explain what this means or how motion is thus imparted, but since the arteries are full of πνεύμα it obviously makes πνεύμα responsible for transmitting bodily movement. This claim, coupled with Praxagoras' belief that the πνεΰμα originates in the heart, which is the central organ, suggests that this fragment presupposes Aristotle's description of bodily motion in de Motu Animalium. It 75 In fact there are two Hippocratic works which suggest that the heart is the center of thought: The short fragment On the Diseases of Maidens (Sigerist, A History of Medicine Vol. II, 287); and On the Heart #10:'... man's intelligence, the principle which rules over the rest of the soul, is situated in the left chamber [of the heart]' (Hippocratic Writings, ed. Lloyd, 351) .
is likely that Praxagoras accepts Aristotle's philosophical theory explaining movement, but modifies it in the light of this own distinction between arteries and veins. It is noteworthy that Praxagoras defends the heart as the center when the Hippocratic school claimed it was the brain. Finally we have Herophilus and Erasistratus, two Alexandrian physicians famous for not only human dissection, but also human vivisection. They were active during the time of Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the second and third heads of the Stoa. They discovered the nerves, and distinguished the sensory nerves responsible for perception from the motor nerves responsible for movement. They proved by dissection that the nerves originated in the brain, and thus claimed the brain to be the central organ and source of thought and perception. This was thereafter the accepted scientific view, which makes it significant that Chrysippus rejected the best scientific evidence of his time and instead embraced the outdated Aristotelian and Praxagorean view that the heart is the central organ.
and Empedocles was perhaps the first to venture an answer with his doctrine of effluences and channels or pores through which these particles travel. He even said that we think with the blood around our heart (fr. 105), which may suggest that the heart was the central organ for him, although I doubt Empedocles thought in such terms. Aristotle and the Hippocratic author were the first to explicitly centralize thought and perception in one organ, and it is only after Aristotle that we see physiologists and philosophers taking sides. Praxagoras and Chrysippus agreed with Aristotle that the heart was central, while Herophilus and Erasistratus proved the Hippocratic author right.
Second, many of these doctors and physiologists were interested in the mechanics of how the body moves. The two above-mentioned fragments of Praxagoras and Erasistratus associating πνεύμα with voluntary motion are tantalizing evidence of what may have been fully developed theories of movement. There is undoubtedly a fascinating story to tell about the corresponding development of philosophical and physiological theories of perception and voluntary movement. 79 Nevertheless, however we explain the relationship between philosophers and physiologists, the fact remains that there is in the medical fragments nothing like Aristotle's theory of desires causing the expansion and contraction of πνεύμα in the heart which in turn moves the body, and this is what we find in Stoic fragments which is peculiarly Aristotelian. My survey of the physiologists here is of necessity cursory, but the most detailed reading of them will not turn up any evidence of the expansion-contraction theory I find common to Aristotle and Chrysippus. It is of course logically possible that the Stoics decided to make impulses expansions and contractions of πνεύμα in the heart independently of Aristotle, but that just does not seem likely considering the spatial and temporal proximity of the inventor of this peculiar theory. It is also possible that Diogenes or Praxagoras or even some unknown natural philosopher developed this theory, and the Stoics borrowed from that source rather than Aristotle; it is even possible that there is some unknown source from which both Aristotle and the Stoics borrowed, thus accounting for the similarities in their views; but a text supporting these possibilities has yet to be unearthed, and scholars must base their interpretations and hypotheses on 79 See, for instance, Solmsen's 'Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves'.
